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Non-Standard Work and Benefits
Has Anything Changed since the Wallace Report?
ISIK URLA ZEYTINOGLU
GORDON B. COOKE
This paper examines whether there has been improvement 
in benefits coverage for non-standard workers since the Wallace 
Report in 1983. This study uses Statistics Canada’s Workplace 
and Employee Survey (WES) 1999 data. Results show significant 
differences in the receipt of benefits among non-standard workers, 
suggesting heterogeneity within this group of workers in terms 
of benefits coverage. Regular part-time and temporary full-time 
workers receive fewer benefits than regular full-time workers. 
Temporary part-time workers have significantly less likelihood of 
receiving benefits than the other three groups of workers. Overall, 
results show that since the Wallace Report findings, there has been 
little improvement in benefits coverage for non-standard workers, 
and they continue to be relatively disadvantaged in comparison to 
regular full-time workers.
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Twenty years have passed by since Wallace’s Part-Time Work in 
Canada: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Part-Time Work (1983). 
The report was the first thorough national level analysis of working condi-
tions in part-time work, the only non-standard work seen as increasing at 
the time. The commission found that many employers, including govern-
ments, were not providing part-time workers benefits or access to pensions. 
Workers were worried about getting sick or injured since they had no 
extended medical, dental, or disability benefits. They were worried about 
their future and did not know whether they would be able to retire since they 
did not have pensions. Since the publication of the Wallace Report, until the 
end of 1990s, part-time work as well as temporary work expanded in the 
newly created jobs (Tabi and Langlois, 2003; Vosko et al., 2003; Zeytinoglu, 
2002), creating a flexible workforce in all sectors of the economy including 
the public sector (Ilcan et al., 2003). During that time period, employment 
laws were amended to provide some coverage to part-time and other non-
standard workers. The growth in part-time and temporary employment is 
now stabilized, though the percentage of workers in the best quality, i.e. 
full-time continuous jobs, is still below the 1989 percentages despite the 
growth in the labour market (Vosko et al., 2003).
The research in this paper is based on the internal labour market (ILM) 
theory (Osterman, 1984 and 1992, Doeringer et al., 1991) and the devel-
oping conceptualization of the heterogeneity in employment systems in 
the ILMs (see, for example, Osterman (1987) for an earlier analysis, and 
Lautsch (2002) and Zeytinoglu and Weber (2002) for recent studies). At the 
time of the Wallace Report and in subsequent early studies, most research 
focused on part-time workers. Full-time workers were considered as the 
‘core’ and part-time workers were in the ‘periphery’ of their organizations 
(see, for example, Atkinson, 1987; Beechey and Perkins, 1987), receiving 
minimal benefits, if any (Zeytinoglu, 1991, 1993). Many new forms of 
non-standard work with a variety of titles emerged in workplaces in the 
last few decades making meaningful comparisons between these seemingly 
different types of work difficult. To avoid problems in comparisons, we 
use a typology of employment contracts developed by Zeytinoglu (1999) 
to categorize many different forms of employment. The typology is a clas-
sification scheme based on characteristics arising from the fundamental 
nature of the employment contracts, i.e. the continuity of the work relation-
ship and the customary work hours (see Zeytinoglu, 1999 and Zeytinoglu 
and Weber, 2002 for further explanation of the typology). We separate 
employment contracts into regular full-time (RFT), i.e. the core employ-
ment contract, and regular part-time (RPT), temporary full-time (TFT) and 
temporary part-time (TPT), with the latter three representing non-standard 
employment contracts, and thus, the periphery. Recently other studies have 
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emerged using the same categorization in their analysis (Cranford et al., 
2003; Vosko et al., 2003).
The study focuses on employer-provided benefits above and beyond 
the legislated benefits. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether 
anything has changed for part-time and other non-standard workers in terms 
of benefits coverage in the last twenty years, or whether they are still in the 
periphery. We also examine whether certain types of non-standard workers 
are particularly disadvantaged regarding the receipt of benefits. If we find 
differences within non-standard workers’ benefit coverage, that will be 
an indication of the heterogeneity within non-standard employment. The 
study uses Statistics Canada’s Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 
1999 data. The WES data contain a large number of variables not usually 
available in other data sets, including employer provided benefit and pen-
sion information.
FINDINGS OF THE WALLACE REPORT
In 1983, the Federal Minister of Labour established the Commission 
of Inquiry into Part-time Work in Canada under the Commissioner Joan 
Wallace to “enquire into improving the employment positions of part-
time workers,” and to determine whether or not part-time workers are 
treated fairly in terms of pay, benefits and pensions compared to full-time 
 workers. The Commission gathered data on benefits and pensions through 
a variety of means: a survey of workers; briefs and letters submitted by 
individuals; submissions from unions; a survey of unions; submissions 
from women’s organizations; submissions from employer associations; a 
survey of employers.
The survey of workers was exploratory, used a non-random sampling 
approach, and received usable responses from 1,884 workers with a 20% 
response rate (Wallace Report, 1983: 18). It found that the major problems 
associated with part-time work were lack of benefits and pensions, and, 
poorer benefits relative to full-time workers. These were reiterated in the 
briefs and letters submitted by individuals. Submissions from 54 unions, and 
a telephone survey of the 41 largest unions in Canada found that unions sup-
ported benefits for part-time workers (on a prorated basis), and inclusion of 
part-time workers in the public pension system. Submissions from women’s 
organizations were unanimous in their support for prorated benefits and 
pensions (both public and employer-sponsored). They urged legislation to 
be introduced to make payments of such benefits mandatory by employers. 
On the other hand, employer associations recommended that no legislation 
be introduced to prorate benefits for part-time workers since they did not 
need such benefits because they were covered by their spouses’ or their 
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parents’ plans’ (Ibid: 132). The commission reported that this was a mis-
conception which, based on the statistics, was simply not true. The survey 
of 204 employers covering 2% of the part-time workforce found that more 
than half of the respondents claimed to treat part-time workers similarly to 
full-time workers (though the ambiguity in the response options meant that 
the respondents might be saying they provide equal benefits and pensions 
to all, or pay part-time workers cash in lieu of benefits, or do not provide 
benefits or pensions to any employees, thus treating everyone equally) (Ibid: 
129-130). The commissioned studies found that “there is very little reliable 
data on the amount of benefits received by part-time workers, [though] it is 
widely believed that they receive substantially fewer benefits than full-time 
workers” (Ibid: 164), and the vast majority of part-time workers are not 
covered by private, employer-sponsored pension plans (Ibid: 149). As this 
brief summary shows, Wallace Report raised the awareness of the peripheral 
position of part-time workers in terms of benefits and pensions.
THEORY AND THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON
NON-STANDARD WORK AND BENEFITS
In terms of theory, most research on non-standard work is discussed, 
at the macro-level, under the dual labour market theory (Doeringer and 
Piore, 1971; Piore, 1986), and at the firm level, within the internal labour 
market theory (ILM) (Osterman, 1984, 1992; Doeringer et al., 1991). Dual 
labour market theory argues that workers are segmented into primary and 
secondary labour markets. The primary labour market is characterized 
by high wages, good benefits, good working conditions, possibilities for 
advancement and promotion, on-the job training, and a relatively stable ten-
ure. The secondary labour market has the opposite characteristics. The ILM 
theory is originally derived from studies of large, predominantly unionized 
workplaces with the workforce showing the characteristics of the primary 
labour market (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). The ILM theory focuses on 
the core workforce with hiring into entry level positions, promotion from 
within, and a set of administrative rules or collective agreements defining 
employment possibilities and training.
The increase in the relative share of non-standard workers to regular 
full-time workers suggested the duality in the ILMs with the core- periphery 
separation of the firm’s labour force, originally discussed by Atkinson 
(1987) and widely used in studies on part-time and other non-standard 
work forms (see, for earlier studies, Beechey and Perkins, 1987, Byton 
and Morris, 1991; Wheeler, 1989, and for recent reviews, Kalleberg, 2000, 
Zeytinoglu and Muteshi, 2000a, 2000b). The core-periphery conceptualiza-
tion acknowledges the existence of a dichotomous employment structure 
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in organizations, whereby regular full-time workers are the ‘core’ group 
working in conditions resembling the primary labour market, and part-time 
workers and other non-standard workers are in the ‘periphery’ of the firm 
with secondary labour market conditions. Research in 1990s highlighted that 
the employer goal to lower labour costs (through low wages and minimal, if 
any, benefits) and to achieve flexibility led to hiring non-standard workers 
(see Kalleberg et al., 1997; Tilly, 1992; Zeytinoglu, 1991, 1992).
The literature traditionally argued that workers in the standard, i.e. 
regular full-time, employment contracts, are in the ‘core’ of the firm’s labour 
market, and workers in non-standard employment contracts are located in 
the ‘periphery.’ At the same time, a few earlier studies suggested that such 
generalizations might not hold for all non-standard employment contracts, 
particularly for regular part-time contracts (Kahne, 1985; Nollen et al., 1978; 
Zeytinoglu, 1992), in a way supporting the employment subsystems within 
ILMs argument of Osterman (1987). Recent research provided additional 
evidence for the possible heterogeneity within non-standard labour contracts 
by showing differences in employment outcomes, including benefits, pro-
vided to workers in various non-standard employment contracts (see, for 
example, Belman and Golden, 2000, 2002; Nollen, 1999; Marshall, 2003; 
Polivka et al., 2000; Zeytinoglu and Weber, 2002). This heterogeneity was 
argued, in part, to be explained by the strategies and practices of manage-
ment (Lautsch, 2002). Research (Zeytinoglu and Weber, 2002) using the 
WES pilot data showed that not all periphery contracts were bad. Some, 
such as regular part-time and temporary full-time contracts, showed some 
good qualities placing them near the core, and temporary part-time jobs 
showed many bad qualities placing them in the periphery, suggesting het-
erogeneity within employment contracts in the ILMs. Thus, the traditional 
core-periphery dichotomy has perhaps become an oversimplification and 
there seemed to be heterogeneity within non-standard employment contracts. 
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on these theoretical foundations 
and evolving conceptualizations.
We examine the associations between working in non-standard employ-
ment contracts and the receipt of non-wage benefits while controlling for 
collective agreement coverage, workplace, industry, and individual charac-
teristics. The dependent variables, assessed for each employment contract 
type, are: receipt of any non-wage benefits, specific benefit received, and 
whether a bundle of benefits is received. The independent variables consist 
of dummy variables representing the four employment contract types. The 
Wallace Report and others (as discussed above) showed that regular and 
casual part-time workers received lower benefits and pensions than full-time 
workers, and in terms of overall working conditions, there was a hierarchy 
with casual part-time workers placed in the least favourable employment 
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conditions as compared to regular part-time workers (Zeytinoglu, 1991, 
1992). Recent studies have expanded the analysis to other non-standard 
employment types and showed that benefits coverage is lower in these con-
tracts (Ferber and Waldfogel, 2000; Houseman, 2001; Lipsett and Reesor, 
1998; Marshall, 2003; Tabi and Langlois, 2003; Zeytinoglu and Weber, 
2002), and the receipt of benefits for non-standard workers is influenced 
by the nature of the work systems in the firm (Lautsch, 2003). In terms of 
pensions, recent research found part-time workers and those in less stable 
employment to be less likely to be entitled to pensions than their full-time 
and stable-employed counterparts (O’Connell and Gash, 2003). Based on 
the theory and reviewed literature, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: RFT workers are significantly more likely to receive 
benefits than other (i.e. non-standard) workers.
Hypothesis 2: TPT workers are significantly less likely to receive 
 benefits than all other workers.
Hypothesis 3: There will not be significant differences in the receipt 
of benefits between those in RPT versus TFT employment 
 contracts.
Though we cannot test and systematically compare our findings to the 
Wallace Report, we expect to find that there has been little improvement 
in working conditions for workers in non-standard employment contracts 
in the last two decades.
METHODOLOGY
Data
We use the Statistics Canada Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 
1999 employee microdata linked to workplace (i.e. employer) microdata. 
The advantage of the WES is that responses from employers and their 
employees have been linked. This paper is a supply-side analysis of the 
labour market using the employee survey as the basis of the data linking 
with the employer survey for some workplace and industry variables. 
WES covers all firms regardless of size. The 1999 WES has data on 
24,597 employees from 6,351 workplaces, with a response rate of 83% 
and 94% respectively. (For more on sampling and sample design, see WES 
Compendium, 2001.)
Variables
Dependent variables are listed in Table 1. We first tested for receipt
of any benefits. The specific benefits, which were assessed individually, 
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were: dental coverage, supplemental medical insurance, life/disability 
insurance, and participation in retirement benefits (i.e. employer- supported 
 pension plan and/or group retirement savings plan). We also tested a 
composite benefit bundle variable representing the receipt of dental, 
supplemental medical, life/disability insurance, and retirement benefits. 
The independent variables are regular full-time (RFT), regular part-time 
(RPT), temporary full-time (TFT), and temporary part-time (TPT), repre-
senting the four types of employment contracts (see Table 2). To create 
these variables, we used usual hours worked and average hours worked 
variables for those with regular and irregular work schedules, respectively, 
to define those working 30 hours or more per week as full-time, and those 
working less as part-time. We further grouped them using self-reports 
of permanent or temporary (including term-limited) employment. Those 
identifying themselves to be in seasonal jobs were excluded since they 
potentially exhibit characteristics of both permanent and non-permanent 
employment contracts.
Control variables consist of three categories: collective agreement 
 coverage, workplace and industry characteristics, and individual charac-
teristics. There is ample research showing the benefits of unionization for 
workers (Fang and Verma, 2002), and that unionization increases the possi-
bility of receiving benefits (Akyeampong, 2002; Jackson and Schellenberg, 
1999; Marshall, 2003; Gunderson, Ponak and Taras, 2001). Though many 
non-standard workers are not covered by collective agreements (Gunderson 
and Hyatt, 2001), and even if covered, receive fewer benefits than full-time 
workers (Zeytinoglu, 1991, 1992), still we include the collective agree-
ment coverage variable to control for the effects of unionization. Previous 
research has shown that the larger the size of the establishment, the  better 
the benefits for part-time and temporary workers (Lipsett and Reesor, 
1998), thus we control for the size of the workplace in our study. In a recent 
analysis of the WES data, Drolet (2002) found that the workplace part-time 
worker rate was a significant factor in explaining the gender wage gap. In 
this paper we include this and the workplace temporary worker rate to con-
trol for their effects in receiving benefits. (We note that in the WES dataset, 
detailed employee information is only available at a workplace, not firm, 
level.) On the whole, the use of part-time and/or temporary work arrange-
ments is less desirable to employees than employers. Therefore, we suspect 
that workplaces that rely more heavily on non-standard workers are also 
potentially more likely to deprive their workers of benefits; and we control 
for the effects of these factors. Human capital characteristics included here 
are the level of education, occupation, and job tenure. Research shows that 
higher level of education, being in a managerial or professional occupation, 
and/or long job tenure increase the possibility of receiving benefits (Lipsett 
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and Reesor, 1998) and occupational differences affect receipt of benefits 
for workers in part-time jobs (Zeytinoglu, 1993). Personal characteristics 
include gender, marital status, dependent children, immigrant status, and 
being a recent immigrant. Women are predominantly in non-standard jobs 
(Cranford et al., 2003; Vosko et al., 2003; Zeytinoglu and Muteshi, 2000a, 
2000b), and married women with children tend to dominate part-time jobs 
(Statistics Canada, 2002). Other studies (Chard et al., 2000; Zeytinoglu 
and Muteshi, 2000a, 2000b) have shown that recent immigrants are dis-
proportionately more in non-standard jobs and their earnings are lower 
than Canadian-born and previous cohorts of immigrants (Thomson, 2002), 
though there is no research on whether they receive benefits in these jobs. 
We control for these human capital and personal characteristics factors that 
can affect our findings. See Table 2 for an explanation of these variables.
TABLE 1
Description of Dependent Variables
Variable Description and Source
(WES 1999 Question)* Purpose/Explanation, Coding
Employee Non-Wage Benefits
Receipt of any benefits (EQ37) To separate those receiving benefits from 
those not receiving any benefits; 1 = Yes 
receive benefits, 0 = No, do not receive 
benefits 
Dental coverage (EQ37e) To identify proportion receiving this benefit; 
1 = Yes, 0 = No, do not receive this benefit
Supplemental medical insurance 
(EQ37d)
To identify proportion receiving this benefit; 
1 = Yes, 0 = No, do not receive this benefit
Life/disability insurance (EQ37c) To identify proportion receiving this benefit; 
1 = Yes, 0 = No, do not receive this benefit
Participation in retirement benefits 
(employer-supported pension plan 
and/or group RRSP (EQ37a and 
EQ37bi))
To identify proportion receiving at least one 
of two benefits; 1 = Yes receive at least one, 
0 = No, do not receive either
Receipt of a bundle of benefits 
(derived from above), consisting 
of dental coverage, supplemental 
medical insurance, life/disability 
insurance, and participation in 
retirement benefits 
To identify proportion receiving this benefit 
bundle; 1 = Yes, 0 = No, do not receive this 
bundle of benefits 
* See http://www.statcan.ca/english/sdds/instrument/2615_Q1_V3_E.pdf for an example 
of a recent version of the WES surveys.
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TABLE 2
Description of Independent and Control Variables
Variable Description and Source
(WES 1999 Question)* Purpose/Explanation, Coding
Independent Variables
Regular Full-Time (RFT) (derived from EQ 
15, EQ 10a and EQ 10d)
Regular employee with no contractual 
or anticipated termination date working 
30 hours or more per week, 1 = Yes, 
0 = Otherwise; (main) reference group
Regular Part-Time (RPT) (derived from EQ 
15, EQ 10a and EQ 10d)
Regular employee with no contractual 
or anticipated termination date working 
less than 30 hours per week, 1 = Yes, 
0 = Otherwise; non-standard employment
Temporary Full-Time (TFT) (derived from 
EQ 15, EQ 10a and EQ 10d)
Casual or on-call employee, or term 
employee where current term of 
employment will end at a specified date 
and working 30 hours or more per week, 
1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise; non-standard 
employment
Temporary Part-Time (TPT) (derived from 
EQ 15, EQ 10a and EQ 10d)
Casual or on-call employee, or term 
employee where current term of 
employment will end at a specified date 
and working less than 30 hours per week, 
1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise; non-standard 
employment
Control Variables
Collective Agreement Coverage (EQ33) In current job, member of a union or 
covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement, 1 = Yes, 0 = No
Workplace Characteristics
Size of the workplace (WQ1a) Total employment at the workplace in 
the last pay period of March 1999
Size of the workplace (log form) Transformed via log10
Workplace Part-time Worker Rate (derived 
from WQ4a/B and WQ1a)
Total number of part-time employees 
receiving a T4 slip at the workplace 
in the last pay period divided by total 
employment at the workplace in the last 
pay period of March 1999 (% part-time)
Workplace Temporary Worker Rate (derived 
from WQ4A/E and WQ1a) 
Total number of temporary (i.e. non-
permanent) employees receiving a T4 
slip at the workplace in the last pay 
period divided by total employment at 
the workplace in the last pay period of 
March 1999 (% temporary)
Industry (derived from dom_ind)
Primary sector (forestry and mining) 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
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Variable Description and Source
(WES 1999 Question)* Purpose/Explanation, Coding
Manufacturing and related sector (including 
construction, transportation, warehousing, 
wholesale, communication and other utilities)
1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise (Reference 
group)
Service sector (Retail trade and consumer 
services, finance and insurance, real estate, 
rental and leasing, business services, 
education and health services, information 
and cultural industries)
1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Human Capital Characteristics
Highest Education Attained (EQ48-EQ50)
Less than high school 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Completed high school 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise 
Some post-secondary (including degree/
certificate/diploma but excluding university 
degree)
1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
University degree or higher 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise (reference group)
Occupation (derived from ocp_grp)
Lower White Collar (clerical/administrative, 
marketing/sales)
1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Higher White Collar (managers) 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise, reference group
Blue Collar and Other (technical/trades, 
production workers with no trade/
certification, professionals, other)
1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Years of Full-Time Work Experience (EQ40) Number of years 
Years of Full-Time Work Experience 
Squared
Number of years squared
Personal Characteristics
Gender (EQ44) 1 = Female, 0 = Male 
Marital status (EQ51 and EQ52)
Married/Common Law partner 1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise, reference group
Other marital status (single, separated, 
divorced, widowed)
1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
Dependent Children (EQ53) 1 = Yes, have dependent children, 0 =  
No
Immigrant Status (EQ46) 1 = Immigrant (not born in Canada), 
0 = Born in Canada
Immigrated in/after 1990 (EQ46a) Oldimm = Immigrated before 1990, 
1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise,
Newimm = Immigrated in or after 1990, 
1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise
TABLE 2 (continued)
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Analysis
We begin with frequency distributions, descriptive statistics and 
 correlations between variables. Following that, we proceed to logistic 
regression analysis. All of the analysis has been generated using weighted 
micro data accessed at Statistics Canada McMaster University Research 
Data Centre (RDC). It should be noted that Statistics Canada strongly 
recommends the use of bootstrapping in statistical analysis using the WES 
dataset due to its  complex survey design. Bootstrapping refers to a process 
of repeatedly drawing random samples, with replacement, from the data at 
hand (Hamilton, 2003). In all presented regression results, we used Statistics 
Canada’s recommended set of 100 bootstrapped employee weights for this 
dataset via the Stata function developed and discussed by Pierard, Buckley, 
and Chowhan (2004).
The regression analysis consisted of several iterations for each benefit 
variable, to test the impact of non-standard employment contracts exclud-
ing and including the set of control variables. Initially, each of the benefit 
variables is regressed on the dummy variables representing each of the 
three non-standard employment contracts, using RFT workers as the refer-
ence group. In the second model, RFTs are excluded and RPTs become 
the reference group. Finally, in Model 3, RFTs and RPTs are excluded, 
and TFTs become the reference group. Subsequently, the three models 
are repeated, but with the set of control variables being added as well. In 
addition, Model 1a is included in the second iteration, when assessing the 
receipt of any benefits and/or the benefit bundle, to illustrate the effect of 
the control variables prior to the inclusion of the independent variables. 
We would like to note here that the overall R2 for a given set of variables 
is not affected by the order in which the variables are entered (Pedhazur 
and Schmelkin, 1991: 423), and in incremental, or hierarchical, variance 
partitioning “it is not uncommon for a variable entered first to account for 
what might be viewed as a reasonable proportion of variance, but when 
entered at a later stage they add very little, even nothing” (Ibid: 426). Since 
the primary focus of this study is the relationship between the employment 
contract status and the receipt of benefits, we will focus on these variables 
in the results section.
Limitations of the Data
The WES data probably under-represents individuals with non-standard 
labour contracts because only employees receiving T4 slips from the estab-
lishment are eligible for sampling under the WES methodology. It should be 
noted that the statistics in this paper only pertain to the proportions of each 
worker group that receive each benefit type. While these differences are 
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revealing, ideally they would be supplemented with a measure of the extent 
or nature of benefits among those receiving coverage. For instance, Luchak 
(1997a, 1997b) outlines why participation in a pension plan does not does 
necessarily equate to access to retirement benefits, much less offer insights 
into the quality of those potential benefits. Partially to address this concern, 
we created the benefit bundle variable. While it is also dichotomous, it gives 
a sense of whether worker sub-groups have access to a range of benefits. 
Finally, due to the relatively small proportions of workers in the three 
non-standard employment contract categories, we were unable to introduce 
interaction variables that could have provided insights. For instance, while 
the collective agreement coverage was found to be highly influential, we 
were unable to assess the interaction of non-standard employment status 
and collective agreement coverage.
Characteristics of the Respondents
More than one-quarter of the workers in this survey are covered by 
a collective agreement, but that includes only a very small percentage of 
part-time and/or temporary workers. In terms of organizational character-
istics, the mean number of employees per workplace exceeds 400, while 
the mean proportion of part-time and temporary employees per workplace 
is 28% and 12%, respectively. Almost two-thirds of surveyed workers are 
in the service sector, with one-third in manufacturing and related, leaving 
only a very small proportion in primary industries. Turning to worker char-
acteristics, more than two-thirds have some post-secondary education, with 
the majority of those being a form other than a university degree. Slightly 
more than one-fifth of workers are in lower level white collar occupations, 
one-seventh are in higher level white collar occupations, with the remain-
der in blue collar and other jobs. The average full-time work experience is 
16 years. Slightly more than half are female, while more than two-thirds 
are married or in a common-law relationship. (Note that data has not been 
adjusted in this paper to account for known populations.) Almost half have 
dependent children. Less than one-fifth are immigrants, while those immi-
grating in or after 1990 are only 3.5%. Details of the descriptive statistics 
are included in Table 3.
RESULTS
Employment Contracts According to the Typology
As shown in Table 3, the large majority of workers, at 83.3%, have 
been categorized as regular full-time. The proportions for RPTs, TFTs, 
and TPTs, are 11.6%, 2.4%, and 2.6%, respectively. The share of those in 
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TABLE 3
Weighted Means of Independent Variables
Variable Label Mean Standard 
Deviation
Proportions
Regular Full-time (RFT)* 83.3
Regular Part-time (RPT)* 11.6
Temporary Full-time (TFT)*  2.4
Temporary Part-time (TPT)*  2.6
Hours/week (usual)**  37.06    8.61
Hours/week (average)**  33.96   15.00
Collective agreement coverage 27.9
Workplace size (in employees) 412.16 1144.49
Workplace size (log form)   1.79    0.86
Workplace part-time worker rate   0.28    0.29
Workplace temporary worker rate   0.12    0.22
Industry
   Primary sector  1.7
   Manufacturing and related sector 33.6
   Service sector 64.7
Highest Education Attained
   Less than high school 10.7
   Completed high school 17.5
   Some post-secondary 52.4
   University degree or higher 19.5
Occupation
   Higher white collar 15.1
   Lower white collar 22.4
   Blue collar and Other 62.6
Full-time work experience  16.17   10.71
Full-time work experience squared 376.14  421.58
Gender (female) 52.1
Marital Status
   Married/common-law 69.1
   Other marital status 30.9
Dependent child(ren) (responsible 
for)
47.2
Immigrant Status
   Immigrant 17.5
   Immigrated in/after 1990  3.5
** Proportions exclude missing and other cases.
** Statistics based on respondents answering this question.
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temporary jobs, whether part-time or full-time, was determined to be 5.0%. 
While this is unexpectedly low, it still represents about 515,000 workers on 
a weighted basis. Among the reasons for the lower than expected percentage 
is that, as noted earlier, we excluded seasonal workers. Recent estimates of 
the full Canadian work force suggest that the share, in 2002, of part-time 
and non-permanent workers was 19% and 13%, respectively (Tabi and 
Langlois, 2003), and an analysis based on the Labour Force Survey shows 
that in 1999, the year our data covers, 11% of the total work force was in 
RPT jobs, 6% in TFT, and 4% in TPT jobs (Vosko et al., 2003).
Distribution of Benefits in Employment Contracts
A key feature of work—and one that can significantly impact workers’ 
sense of security for self and family—are benefits received in addition to 
pay. As presented in Figure 1, three quarters of regular full-time workers 
(RFT) receive at least one benefit. However, among those in three non-
standard groups, the comparable proportions were all under 50%. This 
suggests support for the core-periphery model and the continuation of the 
discrepancy in benefit coverage found by Wallace.
Although there were variations between employment contract catego-
ries, a general pattern emerged when looking at the receipt of non-wage 
benefits. Those in RFT jobs always had the highest likelihood of benefit 
coverage, and TPTs always had the lowest. However, those in TFT  contracts 
often had the second highest proportion receiving benefits, although RPTs 
were not substantially lower. For example, while three fifths of RFT
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workers receive dental benefits from their employers, only one in nine of 
TPTs receive them, while RPTs and TFTs are in the middle at 20% and 
30%, respectively. Similarly, about two thirds of RFTs receive supplemental 
medical insurance, compared to one fifth and one third of the RPTs and 
TFTs, respectively, and (again) about one in nine of the TPTs.
Life/disability insurance also exhibited a tiered pattern. While two thirds 
of RFTs receive this benefit, less than one quarter of RPTs and TFTs do, 
while the proportion among TPTs is again much lower. Also, more than half 
of the RFTs receive retirement benefits compared to roughly one quarter 
of the RPTs and TFTs, followed by one in eight of the TPTs. The pattern 
was again encountered with respect to the benefit bundle. Well over one 
third of RFTs received the bundle, compared to roughly one in ten of the 
RPTs and TFTs, and fewer than one in twenty of the TPTs.
Correlation Results
Correlations between the non-standard employment contract categories 
and the benefit variables are shown in Table 4. Due to the sheer size of this 
(weighted) sample, virtually all pairs of variables tend to have a statistically 
significant bivariate correlation. (When assessing pairs of dichotomous 
(i.e. categorical) variables, we calculate and present the phi coefficient. 
For convenience, we will refer to them as correlations as well.) The key 
is whether the magnitude of a particular correlation is substantively sig-
nificant. Consistent with the set of hypotheses, the receipt of benefits is 
negatively correlated with each of the non-standard employment contract 
types. The magnitude of those relationships ranges from –0.05 to –0.24. 
While the statistical significance of all of the correlations was very strong 
(at p < 0.01), the absolute magnitude was relatively small in some cases. 
Not surprisingly, all correlations between pairs of benefit variables were 
strong and positive.
Regression Results
Detailed results are provided in Tables 5-11. Each table includes the 
(pseudo) R2 for each model, the odds ratio and significance levels for each 
independent variable. Odds ratios for each model are presented rather than 
regression coefficients, since the former tends to provide a more mean-
ingful indication of the influence of each independent variable in logistic 
regression. For example, an odds ratio closer to zero than one is a strong 
indicator that those exhibiting a particular characteristic (such as being in 
one of the non-standard employment contract categories) are relatively 
unlikely to receive a given benefit. As was the case with the correlation 
results, variables in the regression models may be statistically significant 
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even if the effect size is small. Therefore, we use a rule of thumb that a 
variable has a meaningful impact only when the odds ratio is statistically 
significant and the odds ratio is less than 0.9 or greater than 1.1. We now 
briefly return to our hypotheses. If the odds ratios for all three non-standard 
employment contracts in Model 1 are significantly lower than 1.0, then 
that supports the first hypothesis that RFTs receive higher benefit coverage 
than all others. For hypothesis 2 to be supported, the odds ratio for TPTs 
in Models 1, 2, and 3 must be significantly below 1.0 (meaning benefit 
coverage is lower for TPTs compared to all three other groups). Finally, 
for hypothesis 3 to be supported, the odds ratio for TFTs in Model 2 must 
be insignificant, indicating that TFTs and RPTs have essentially the same 
benefit coverage. Of course, the possibility exists that the odds ratios for 
some dependent variables support the hypotheses, but odds ratios for other 
benefits do not.
First, we examine the relationships excluding control variables. Results 
are provided in Table 5 for models without control variables for all benefits. 
In all cases, RFTs are significantly and substantially more likely to receive 
each benefit (see Model 1), as presumed in hypothesis 1. This provides 
support for the extension of the core-periphery conceptualization to benefit 
coverage, and is in line with the Wallace Report findings. Interestingly, for 
five of the six dependent variables, TFTs are more likely to receive benefits 
than RPTs (see Model 2), although the difference is only significant in two 
instances (i.e. dental benefits and supplemental medical insurance). In the 
sixth case (i.e. life/disability insurance), the odds ratio for TFTs is slightly 
below 1.0, but insignificant as well. Finally, for five of the six dependent 
variables, TPTs are significantly less likely to receive benefits compared 
to all others. For the benefit bundle, however, TPTs cannot be statistically 
separated (with confidence) from RPTs and/or TFTs.
Next, we provide an analysis of relationships including control 
 variables. The regressions shown in Table 5 were regenerated after adding 
the set of control variables. Due to the large size of these models, separate 
tables are provided for each benefit. Turning now to the results, one inter-
esting variation is that once the control set of variables is introduced, RPTs 
become more likely to receive each benefit than TFTs, which was a reversal 
from Table 5. In half of those cases, though, that difference is insignificant. 
Overall, a general pattern emerges in which RFTs are much more likely to 
receive benefits than the three non-standard groups, and that among only 
the non-standard groups, TPTs are clearly the most disadvantaged in terms 
of overall benefit coverage.
Receipt of any benefits. Results pertaining to the receipt of any benefits 
are shown in Table 6. Adding the three non-standard employment variables 
to the control variables (i.e. Model 1 vs. Model 1a) captures an extra 2.8% 
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TABLE 5
The Effect of Employment Contracts on Benefits
(Simple Regression Models)
Sample: All No RFT No RFT/RPT
Model: 1 2 3
Dep. Variable Independent Variables Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
Receipt of any 
benefits
Regular Part-time (RPT) 0.23***0
Temporary Full-time (TFT) 0.32***0 1.34***0
Temporary Part-time (TPT) 0.20***0 0.84***0 0.74***0
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.053*** 0.002*** 0.003***
  
Receipt of 
benefit bundle
Regular Part-time (RPT) 0.17***0
Temporary Full-time (TFT) 0.25***0 1.50***0
Temporary Part-time (TPT) 0.08***0 0.48***0 0.42***0
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.047*** 0.009*** 0.015***
 
Dental coverage Regular Part-time (RPT) 0.17***0
Temporary Full-time (TFT) 0.30***0 1.69***0
Temporary Part-time (TPT) 0.09***0 0.49***0 0.39***0
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.065*** 0.013*** 0.022***
 
Supplemental 
medical
Regular Part-time (RPT) 0.17***0
Temporary Full-time (TFT) 0.32***0 1.85***0
Temporary Part-time (TPT) 0.09***0 0.49***0 0.38***0
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.066*** 0.016*** 0.024**0
 
Life/Disability 
insurance
Regular Part-time (RPT) 0.17***0
Temporary Full-time (TFT) 0.18***0 0.97***0
Temporary Part-time (TPT) 0.09***0 0.50***0 0.44***0
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.073*** 0.007*** 0.018**0
 
Participation 
in retirement 
benefits
Regular Part-time (RPT) 0.29***0
Temporary Full-time (TFT) 0.39***0 1.32***0
Temporary Part-time (TPT) 0.16***0 0.54***0 0.49***0
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.033*** 0.007*** 0.013***
Note: Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
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of the variation of this benefit. More importantly, the odds ratios for all non-
standard employment contracts are statistically significant and substantially 
below 1.0 in all models. That indicates that RFTs are the most advantaged, 
followed, in order, by RPTs, TFTs, then TPTs.
TABLE 6
Employment Contracts and Other Variables Affecting Receipt
of Any Benefits
Sample: All All No RFT No RFT/RPT
Model: 1a 1 2 3
Independent Variables Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
Regular Part-time (RPT) 0.35***0
Temporary Full-time (TFT) 0.14***0 0.46***0
Temporary Part-time (TPT) 0.14***0 0.40***0 0.62***0
Collective agreement coverage 2.01***0 2.32***0 4.29***0 5.12***0
Size of the workplace (logform) 3.44***0 3.61***0 2.58***0 2.16***0
Workplace part-time worker rate 0.21***0 0.30***0 0.35***0 0.31***0
Workplace temporary worker rate 0.54***0 0.58***0 0.52***0 0.78***0
Primary sector 0.96***0 0.97***0 1.38***0 1.50***0
Manufacturing and related 
sector (ref.)
Service sector 0.87***0 0.93***0 1.11***0 1.62***0
Less than high school 0.41***0 0.40***0 0.66***0 1.53***0
Completed high school 0.72***0 0.68***0 0.89***0 2.26***0
Some post-secondary 0.83***0 0.82***0 1.02***0 1.32***0
University degree or higher (ref.)
Lower white collar 0.55***0 0.65***0 0.55***0 0.68***0
Higher white collar (ref.)
Blue collar and other 0.55***0 0.63***0 0.67***0 0.38***0
Work experience (FTE) 1.08***0 1.06***0 1.00***0 1.00***0
Work experience – Sqrd 1.00***0 1.00***0 1.00***0 1.00***0
Gender (female) 1.00***0 1.09***0 1.26***0 0.93***0
Married/Common Law Partner 
(ref.)
Not Married/Common Law 0.91***0 0.88***0 0.82***0 1.25***0
Dependent Child(ren) 1.00***0 1.04***0 1.51***0 1.35***0
Immigrant Status 0.80***0 0.79***0 1.28***0 0.99***0
Immigrated in/after 1990 0.82***0 0.77***0 0.27***0 0.23***0
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.234*** 0.262*** 0.265*** 0.225***
Sample size 23209*** 23209*** 3485*** 1917***
Note: Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
Receipt of benefit bundle. As shown in Table 7, the odds ratios for all 
non-standard employment contracts are statistically significant and sub-
stantially below 1.0 in Model 1, indicating that RFTs are the most likely to 
receive the benefit bundle. Also, adding the three non-standard  employment 
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variables to the control variables captured an incremental 2.2% of the varia-
tion in the receipt of this bundle. The results in models 2 and 3 regarding 
the dummy employment contract variables indicate that RPTs and TFTs 
receive essentially the same coverage of the benefit bundle (although the 
lower odds ratios for TFTs suggest that their coverage appears to be some-
what poorer), with TPTs receiving significantly poorer coverage than the 
other non-standard groups.
TABLE 7
Employment Contracts and Other Variables Affecting Receipt
of Benefit Bundle
Sample: All All NO RFT NO RFT/RPT
Model: 1a 1 2 3
Independent Variables Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
Regular Part-time (RPT) 0.26***0
Temporary Full-time (TFT) 0.20***0 0.82***0
Temporary Part-time (TPT) 0.09***0 0.32***0 0.39***0
Collective agreement 
coverage 1.48***0 1.55***0 3.03***0 3.09***0
Size of the workplace 
(logform) 2.83***0 2.92***0 2.23***0 2.20***0
Workplace part-time worker 
rate 0.28***0 0.39***0 0.53***0 0.40***0
Workplace temporary worker 
rate 0.51***0 0.54***0 0.50***0 0.75***0
Primary sector 1.57***0 1.58***0 3.14***0 3.73***0
Manufacturing and related 
sector (ref.)
Service sector 0.77***0 0.81***0 0.76***0 1.06***0
Less than high school 0.50***0 0.50***0 0.84***0 1.32***0
Completed high school 0.93***0 0.89***0 0.89***0 1.58***0
Some post-secondary 0.88***0 0.87***0 0.89***0 1.10***0
University degree or higher 
(ref.)
Lower white collar 0.54***0 0.60***0 0.82***0 1.94***0
Higher white collar (ref.)
Blue collar and other 0.47***0 0.52***0 1.20***0 1.58***0
Work experience (FTE) 1.08***0 1.06***0 1.02***0 1.02***0
Work experience – Sqrd 1.00***0 1.00***0 1.00***0 1.00***0
Gender (female) 0.82***0 0.88***0 1.01***0 0.69***0
Married/Common Law 
Partner (ref.)
Not Married/Common Law 0.91***0 0.89***0 0.84***0 1.07***0
Dependent Child(ren) 0.94***0 0.98***0 0.92***0 0.86***0
Immigrant Status 1.02***0 1.02***0 2.05***0 1.99***0
Immigrated in/after 1990 0.86***0 0.84***0 0.28***0 0.10***0
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.189***0 0.211*** 0.192*** 0.167***
Sample size 23209*** 23209*** 3485*** 1917***
Note: Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
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Dental benefits coverage. As per Table 8, the odds ratios for all non-
standard employment contracts are statistically significant and substantially 
below 1.0 in Model 1, and for TPTs (only) in Models 2 and 3. As was the 
case with the benefit bundle, these results support all three hypotheses. That 
is, RFTs have the best dental coverage, TPTs the poorest, with RPTs and 
TFTs (together) in the middle. Finally, adding the non-standard employment 
variables captured an incremental 3.0% of the variation in dental coverage 
among all workers (i.e. Model 1a vs. Model 1).
Supplemental medical insurance. The results in Table 9 are very similar 
to those in Tables 7 and 8. As with those variables, supplemental medical 
insurance appears to have three tiers of coverage, with RFTs the high-
est, RPTs and TFTs in the middle, and TPTs the poorest. Turning to the 
pseudo R2s of Model 1a versus Model 1, the inclusion of the non-standard 
employment variables explained an extra 2.9% of the variation in coverage 
of this benefit.
Life/disability insurance. Results for this variable are shown in Table 
10. Firstly, it should be noted that adding the three dummy employment 
contract variables captured an extra 3.7% of the variation in life/disability 
insurance coverage. Also, the odds ratios for all non-standard employment 
contracts are statistically significant and substantially below 1.0 in all 
models. That indicates that RFTs are the most likely to receive this benefit, 
followed, in order, by RPTs, TFTs, and TPTs.
Participation in retirement benefits. As shown in Table 11, results 
were consistent with the pattern found with life/disability insurance cover-
age and the receipt of any benefits. That is, RFTs are the most likely to 
participate in retirement benefits, followed, in order, by RPTs, TFTs, and 
TPTs. Finally, an extra 2.3% of variation in the eligibility for retirement 
benefits was captured by adding the non-standard employment variables 
beyond that explained by the control set (i.e. Model 1a).
Impact of control variables. Among Tables 6-11, collective agree-
ment coverage and workplace size were consistently found to be the most 
 influential. Both were strongly and positively related to the receipt of each 
benefit in all models. This is consistent with previous findings in the litera-
ture that the unionization and/or the larger size of the workplace increase 
the probability of receiving benefits. Interestingly, the part-time worker 
rate was found to be a significant and negative predictor of the receipt of 
benefits, in at least some models, for all benefits. On the other hand, results 
were generally weaker regarding the temporary worker rate. While the 
temporary worker rate appeared to be a negative predictor of each benefit 
(as shown by odds ratios well below 1.0), statistical significance was found 
less frequently and/or at weaker levels.
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TABLE 8
Employment Contracts and Other Variables Affecting
Dental Benefits Coverage
Sample: All All NO RFT NO RFT/FPT
Model: 1a 1 2 3
Independent Variables Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
Regular Part-time (RPT) 0.28***0
Temporary Full-time (TFT) 0.22***0 0.83***0
Temporary Part-time (TPT) 0.10***0 0.30***0 0.32***0
Collective agreement coverage 1.45***0 1.56***0 3.55***0 4.27***0
Size of the workplace (logform) 2.26***0 2.33***0 1.61***0 1.55***0
Workplace part-time worker rate 0.22***0 0.32***0 0.49***0 0.37***0
Workplace temporary worker 
rate 0.49***0 0.51***0 0.64***0 0.96***0
Primary sector 1.24***0 1.25***0 1.84***0 2.11***0
Manufacturing and related sector 
(ref.)
Service sector 0.77***0 0.82***0 0.89***0 1.51***0
Less than high school 0.48***0 0.48***0 0.79***0 1.40***0
Completed high school 0.92***0 0.88***0 1.27***0 2.25***0
Some post-secondary 0.93***0 0.92***0 1.14***0 1.66***0
University degree or higher (ref.)
Lower white collar 0.53***0 0.61***0 0.63***0 0.70***0
Higher white collar (ref.)
Blue collar and other 0.51***0 0.58***0 1.00***0 0.85***0
Work experience (FTE) 1.08***0 1.05***0 1.00***0 0.99***0
Work experience – Sqrd 1.00***0 1.00***0 1.00***0 1.00***0
Gender (female) 0.84***0 0.91***0 1.35***0 1.06***0
Married/Common Law Partner 
(ref.)
Not Married/Common Law 1.06***0 1.03***0 0.97***0 1.60***0
Dependent Child(ren) 0.88***0 0.92***0 1.07***0 0.96***0
Immigrant Status 1.07***0 1.07***0 1.66***0 2.02***0
Immigrated in/after 1990 0.93***0 0.87***0 0.43***0 0.29***0
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.159*** 0.189*** 0.165***0 0.165***
Sample size 23209*** 23209*** 3485*** 1917***
Note: Significance levels: *** p <.01, ** p <.05, * p < .10
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TABLE 9
Employment Contracts and Other Variables Affecting Supplemental
Medical Insurance
Sample: All All No RFT No RFT/RPT
Model: 1a 1 2 3
Independent Variables Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
Regular Part-time (RPT) 0.28***0
Temporary Full-time (TFT) 0.24***0 0.90***0
Temporary Part-time (TPT) 0.10***0 0.32***0 0.39***0
Collective agreement coverage 1.43***0 1.54***0 3.07***0 3.28***0
Size of the workplace 
(logform) 2.35***0 2.43***0 1.84***0 1.92***0
Workplace part-time worker 
rate 0.19***0 0.28***0 0.44***0 0.42***0
Workplace temporary worker 
rate 0.60***0 0.64***0 0.68***0 0.73***0
Primary sector 1.10***0 1.11***0 1.71***0 1.69***0
Manufacturing and related 
sector (ref.)
Service sector 0.76***0 0.81***0 0.92***0 1.21***0
Less than high school 0.46***0 0.45***0 0.72***0 1.35***0
Completed high school 0.80***0 0.76***0 0.93***0 1.37***0
Some post-secondary 0.83***0 0.82***0 0.85***0 0.97***0
University degree or higher 
(ref.)
Lower white collar 0.53***0 0.62***0 0.33***0 0.25***0
Higher white collar (ref.)
Blue collar and other 0.51***0 0.58***0 0.47***0 0.18***0
Work experience (FTE) 1.09***0 1.07***0 1.04***0 1.01***0
Work experience – Sqrd 1.00***0 1.00***0 1.00***0 1.00***0
Gender (female) 0.80***0 0.87***0 0.87***0 0.65***0
Married/Common Law Partner 
(ref.)
Not Married/Common Law 1.10***0 1.08***0 1.11***0 1.36***0
Dependent Child(ren) 0.86***0 0.90***0 1.04***0 0.94***0
Immigrant Status 0.95***0 0.94***0 1.54***0 0.72***0
Immigrated in/after 1990 0.92***0 0.87***0 0.24***0 0.28***0
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.177*** 0.206*** 0.177*** 0.169***
Sample size 23209*** 23209*** 3485*** 1917***
Note: Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
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TABLE 10
Employment Contracts and Other Variables
Affecting Life/Disability Insurance
Sample: All All No RFT No RFT/RPT
Model: 1a 1 2 3
Independent Variables Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
Regular Part-time (RPT) 0.28***0
Temporary Full-time (TFT) 0.11***0 0.41***0
Temporary Part-time (TPT) 0.08***0 0.29***0 0.42***0
Collective agreement coverage 1.48***0 1.65***0 3.12***0 4.45***0
Size of the workplace (logform) 2.74***0 2.92***0 2.04***0 1.67***0
Workplace part-time worker rate 0.16***0 0.23***0 0.32***0 0.36***0
Workplace temporary worker rate 0.69***0 0.77***0 0.62***0 0.80***0
Primary sector 1.07***0 1.09***0 1.73***0 2.15***0
Manufacturing and related sector 
(ref.)
Service sector 0.78***0 0.84***0 0.96***0 1.41***0
Less than high school 0.47***0 0.46***0 0.85***0 2.83***0
Completed high school 0.82***0 0.75***0 1.19***0 2.76***0
Some post-secondary 0.82***0 0.80***0 1.02***0 2.05***0
University degree or higher (ref.)
Lower white collar 0.55***0 0.64***0 0.33***0 0.22***0
Higher white collar (ref.)
Blue collar and other 0.57***0 0.66***0 0.51***0 0.24***0
Work experience (FTE) 1.09***0 1.07***0 1.01***0 1.02***0
Work experience - Sqrd 1.00***0 1.00***0 1.00***0 1.00***0
Gender (female) 0.90***0 1.00***0 1.00***0 0.77***0
Married/Common Law Partner 
(ref.)
Not Married/Common Law 0.90***0 0.87***0 0.95***0 1.03***0
Dependent Child(ren) 0.98***0 1.03***0 1.30***0 0.93***0
Immigrant Status 0.76***0 0.74***0 1.06***0 1.11***0
Immigrated in/after 1990 0.69***0 0.65***0 0.23***0 0.05***0
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.208***0 0.245*** 0.201*** 0.181***
Sample size 23209*** 23209*** 3485*** 1917***
Note: Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
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TABLE 11
Employment Contracts and Other Variables Affecting Participation in 
Retirement Benefits
Sample: All All No RFT No RFT/RPT
Model: 1a 1 2 3
Independent Variables Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio
Regular Part-time (RPT) 0.37***0
Temporary Full-time (TFT) 0.18***0 0.50***0
Temporary Part-time (TPT) 0.08***0 0.19***0 0.29***0
Collective agreement coverage 2.48***0 2.73***0 4.91***0 7.22***0
Size of the workplace (logform) 3.51***0 3.71***0 2.45***0 2.20***0
Workplace part-time worker rate 0.38***0 0.54***0 0.77***0 0.36***0
Workplace temporary worker rate 0.57***0 0.63***0 0.78***0 1.33***0
Primary sector 1.49***0 1.51***0 2.74***0 3.12***0
Manufacturing and related sector 
(ref.)
Service sector 0.97***0 1.02***0 1.02***0 1.75***0
Less than high school 0.52***0 0.50***0 0.85***0 2.20***0
Completed high school 0.90***0 0.85***0 0.72***0 2.10***0
Some post-secondary 0.95***0 0.94***0 0.92***0 1.37***0
University degree or higher (ref.)
Lower white collar 0.50***0 0.55***0 0.70***0 0.70***0
Higher white collar (ref.)
Blue collar and other 0.51***0 0.56***0 1.58***0 1.05***0
Work experience (FTE) 1.08***0 1.06***0 1.01***0 0.94***0
Work experience - Sqrd 1.00***0 1.00***0 1.00***0 1.00***0
Gender (female) 0.96***0 1.03***0 1.30***0 0.89***0
Married/Common Law Partner 
(ref.)
Not Married/Common Law 0.84***0 0.81***0 0.81***0 1.00***0
Dependent Child(ren) 0.95***0 0.99***0 1.33***0 1.07***0
Immigrant Status 0.88***0 0.87***0 1.81***0 1.97***0
Immigrated in/after 1990 0.89***0 0.85***0 0.19***0 0.09***0
Pseudo R-Sqr 0.246*** 0.269*** 0.304*** 0.282***
Sample size 23209*** 23209*** 3485*** 1917***
Note: Significance levels: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10
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The following discussion explores the magnitude of the odds ratios 
of variables of interest even in some circumstances where results are not 
statistically significant. Results were generally in line with expectations 
regarding other control variables, albeit with relatively weak and unstable 
patterns. For instance, those workers with less than high school education 
were significantly less likely to access benefits only when considering all 
workers (i.e. Models 1 and 1a). On the other hand, those with a university 
degree were relatively unlikely to receive benefits among those in temporary 
jobs (i.e. as shown by odds ratios above 1.0 for all other education levels 
in Model 3 in Tables 6-11), perhaps since highly-educated workers in this 
category were more likely to be in consulting or contracting arrangements 
where remuneration is via a per diem that includes a provision in lieu of 
benefits. Similarly, immigrants were somewhat unlikely to receive benefits 
when assessing all workers, but the pattern was quite mixed when only 
 considering those in non-standard employment contracts. No clear pattern 
was detected regarding the receipt of benefits and marital status, the pres-
ence of dependent children, and/or years of work experience. Relative to 
those in managerial jobs, lower white collar and/or other workers were sig-
nificantly less likely to receive benefits in most cases, although the pattern 
was inexplicably reversed (albeit without statistical significance) regarding 
the receipt of the benefit bundle! The general pattern according to indus-
try was that those in the primary sector were more likely to receive most 
benefits, while access varied sharply between those in the service sector 
versus the manufacturing sector from benefit to benefit. Frequently, though, 
industry sector results were not significant. Moreover, the proportion of 
workers employed in the primary sector is very small, so even significant 
findings should be used cautiously. Finally, the impact of gender was weak 
but interesting. While females were slightly more likely to receive some 
benefits when including all workers, they were less likely than males to 
receive the benefit bundle. The pattern was fairly mixed regarding gender 
and benefit receipt among only non-standard workers.
As a set, the control variables were quite influential, judging by the 
magnitude of the pseudo-R2 of Model 1a versus Model 1 in Tables 6-11, 
and/or the pseudo-R2 of the simple models in Table 5. Nonetheless, the odds 
ratios for the employment contract variables are not materially different in 
the “full” models (i.e. Model 1 in Tables 6-11) versus the simple models 
(i.e. Model 1 in Table 5). The odds ratios are somewhat higher (i.e. closer to 
one) for RPTs in the full models, which suggests that the control variables 
explain some of the differences in benefit coverage between RPTs and 
RFTs. On the other hand, the odds ratios are somewhat lower for TFTs and 
about the same for TPTs in the full models. When controlling for the effect 
of other variables, the extent of the benefit coverage deficiency endured by 
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workers in these two groups, relative to RFTs, is revealed. On the whole, 
the lower benefit coverage facing workers in non-standard employment 
contracts occurs whether or not controlling for other variables.
Sensitivity Analysis. To test the robustness of the results, we re-gener-
ated Model 1 from Tables 6 and 7 among worker sub-groups of interest 
based on the two most influential control variables. (Due to space con-
straints, specific figures from the sensitivity analysis are not presented 
in table format. As with other results, more details are available from the 
authors, upon request.) Firstly, we consider collective agreement coverage. 
Interestingly, results were quite similar, albeit higher, among (only) those 
covered by a collective agreement compared to those not covered. The 
one difference is that TFTs appear to be as disadvantaged as TPTs among 
non-union workers. There were distinct tiers of coverage (i.e. RPTs first, 
then TFTs, then TPTs) among unionized non-standard workers. In all cases, 
though, RFTs have substantially higher benefit coverage. In essence, then, 
collective agreement coverage seems to affect the likelihood that workers 
receive benefits, but it does not materially affect the gap between core and 
non-standard workers regarding benefit coverage among those covered or 
not covered.
The other highly influential control variable was workplace size, with 
those in larger workplaces more likely to receive benefits. Therefore, we 
examined employees in large workplaces (i.e. > 500 workers) and small 
(i.e. < 100) workplaces. The gap size in benefits coverage among workers in 
non-standard employment contracts (versus RFTs) was quite similar among 
those in large workplaces compared to the results for all workers. However, 
in small organizations, there was a more distinct division between temporary 
workers and RPTs among non-standard workers, with the former having 
much lower benefit coverage. In fact, the results suggested that TFTs may 
have lower benefit coverage than TPTs in smaller workplaces.
Finally, we examined only those employed in the service sector. 
While this variable was not particularly influential in Tables 6-11, existing 
literature indicated that these workers were relatively unlikely to receive 
benefits, and this sector tends to rely more heavily on the use of non-stan-
dard workers. These results were almost identical to those shown in Table 
6 and 7, suggesting that service sector benefit coverage is consistent with 
that found in other sectors.
Overall, our results provided further evidence that there is heterogeneity 
within non-standard employment contracts, at least as far as benefit cover-
age is concerned. The results provided empirical support for employment 
subsystems within ILMs argument of Osterman (1987), contributing to the 
evolving conceptualizations of peripheries within non-standard  employment 
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contracts within ILMs argument of Belman and Golden (2000, 2002), 
Lautsch (2002) and Zeytinoglu and Weber (2002), among others.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we examined if anything has changed for non-standard 
workers in terms of benefits since the publication the Wallace Report, 
Part-Time Work in Canada: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Part-
Time Work (1983). We expanded the analysis beyond part-time workers 
(which was the focus in the Wallace Report), to other types of non-standard 
employment contracts. We focused on benefits that employers provide to 
workers and examined whether non-standard workers are relatively unlikely 
to receive benefits. Though a systematic comparison between the findings 
of the Wallace Report and ours is difficult due to the non-comparability of 
the data and the methodology, still some generalizations similar to Wallace 
Report’s findings emerged. We found that, in addition to the core-periphery 
segmentation, there appears to be heterogeneity within non-standard work-
ers, and a hierarchy of benefit coverage among these workers. The results 
provided very strong support for hypothesis 1, and quite strong support for 
hypothesis 2. On the other hand, the descriptive statistics and results from 
the simple regression models in Table 5 suggested that TFTs are equally 
or more likely to receive benefits than RPTs. Once control variables were 
included to the regression models, however, the reverse was found, with 
RPTs having equal or superior benefit coverage compared to TFTs. The net 
effect is that we can only place RPTs and TFTs in a middle category without 
explicitly accepting hypothesis 3. That is, workers in the regular part-time 
(RPT) and temporary full-time (TFT) categories are in the near-core in the 
sense that their benefit coverage is poorer than RFT workers but better than 
that received by temporary part-timers (TPTs). Those in temporary part-time 
contracts are in the periphery and receive tangibly fewer benefits, on aver-
age, than even those in other non-standard employment categories. Regular 
full-time workers, though, are alone in the “core” with significantly better 
benefit coverage, whether or not controlling for other variables.
A key concern in the industrial relations literature is whether the growth 
of non-standard work arrangements has a multiplier effect on workers in 
the periphery, to the extent that work rewards are lower now, benefits 
for the future are poorer, and opportunities to advance into more desir-
able job streams are unavailable. There is a worry that some are trapped 
in non-standard jobs, and that this may affect future as well as current 
employment conditions. When considering that the receipt of non-wage 
benefits can be a key component of work and life outcomes, these results 
confirm similar findings that workers in temporary and/or part-time jobs 
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have poorer employment conditions. As was the case 20 years ago when 
Wallace presented her results, non-standard workers continue to be at a 
disadvantage regarding the receipt of benefits. Regular full-time workers 
appear to have the best benefits, while others are in an employment stream 
of lesser privileges. Moreover, employment conditions differ within the 
periphery, in that RPTs and TFTs are relatively advantaged, while TPTs 
are the most marginalized. Thus, similar to findings of the Wallace Report, 
the workers covered in our study probably still worry about getting sick or 
injured, and how to support themselves in old age since they continue to 
be less likely to have comparable benefit coverage.
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RÉSUMÉ
Travail atypique et avantages sociaux : y a-t-il eu
des changements depuis le Rapport Wallace ?
Au cours des deux dernières décennies, la nature du travail et aussi 
des relations de travail ont connu des changements importants. En clair, 
plusieurs contrats de travail atypiques ont vu le jour et ils se généralisent. 
On se demande donc, dans les écrits sur le sujet, si les conditions de travail 
dans ces contrats non standards sont bonnes ou non. D’une part, la théorie 
du double marché du travail soutient que le marché du travail primaire se 
caractérise par des salaires et des avantages sociaux élevés et, en général, 
par de bonnes conditions de travail, alors que le marché du travail secondaire 
présente des caractéristiques contraires. D’autre part, des études depuis les 
années 1980 suggèrent que dans les marchés de travail internes, les contrats 
à plein temps et permanents se situent au centre ou au « noyau », et que 
les contrats nouveaux se retrouvent à la périphérie. De plus, la recherche 
récente laisse voir une segmentation possible à l’intérieur même des contrats 
de travail atypiques.
Dans cet essai, nous nous sommes penchés sur la probabilité que ceux 
et celles qui occupent des emplois sur une base occasionnelle ou à temps 
partiel jouissent d’avantages sociaux fournis par leurs employeurs compa-
rativement à ceux qui détiennent des emplois permanents et à temps plein. 
D’une manière plus précise, cet étude tente de vérifier s’il y a eu ou non 
des améliorations eu égard aux avantages sociaux chez les travailleurs assu-
jettis à des contrats atypiques depuis le dépôt du Rapport Wallace en 1983. 
Rappelons brièvement que le rapport a démontré que plusieurs em ployeurs 
ne fournissaient pas d’avantages sociaux aux temps-partiels et aucun accès 
à des rentes de retraite. Alors que ce rapport s’en tenait seulement aux 
conditions faites aux travailleurs à temps partiel, nous adoptons ici une 
perspective plus large, reflétant le travail atypique actuel. Cette analyse est 
pertinente puisque le fait de recevoir des avantages autres que les salaires 
devient un élément important au moment d’évaluer la qualité des contrats 
de travail et l’hétérogénéité supposée des contrats atypiques.
L’étude se sert des données de l’Enquête sur le lieu de travail et les 
employés (ELTE) de 1999. Sur une base pondérée, cette enquête couvre 
presque 10,8 millions de travailleurs du secteur privé au Canada. L’avantage 
de l’ELTE réside dans le fait que les réponses des employeurs et de leurs 
employés ont été saisies. C’est pourquoi elle comporte l’avantage important 
de pouvoir faire un lien entre les réponses des employeurs et celles des 
employés dans des situations particulières d’affaires. Nous avons ventilé les 
contrats d’emploi en quatre catégories : (1) permanent à plein temps (PPT); 
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(2) permanent à temps partiel (PTP); (3) temporaire à plein temps (TPT); 
(4) temporaire à temps partiel (TTP); les trois derniers types représentant 
les contrats de travail atypiques. Nous faisons l’hypothèse qu’en plus de 
la séparation bien connue entre les employés permanents à temps plein et 
les trois autres groupes, il existe aussi une grande hétérogénéité chez les 
atypiques. Afin de vérifier cette hypothèse, nous centrons notre attention sur 
les avantages hors-salaire. Pour chaque type de contrat d’emploi, nous avons 
vérifié : (1) la présence ou non d’avantage hors-salaire; (2) la présence d’un 
groupe d’avantages reçus, et (3) la présence d’avantages spécifiques reçus. 
Les avantages spécifiques répertoriés sont les soins dentaires, l’assurance 
médicale supplémentaire, l’assurance vie et invalidité et les prestations de 
retraite. Ce sont ces avantages sociaux qui forment le groupe dont il est 
question au point (2).
Nous avons d’abord procédé à une analyse descriptive des données pour 
les soumettre par la suite à une analyse de régression linéaire multivariée. 
Dans une itération, chaque avantage est traité par l’emploi de variables 
nominales représentant chacun des trois contrats de travail atypiques. Par 
la suite, ce procédé est repris après avoir ajouté un éventail de variables 
de contrôle.
Les résultats montrent des différences importantes dans l’obtention 
d’avantages sociaux chez les travailleurs liés par des contrats de travail 
atypiques, que l’on maintienne constantes ou non les caractéristiques de 
l’industrie ou du lieu de travail, les facteurs démographiques et humains. 
Les données descriptives démontrent que ces différences sont considéra-
bles. Par exemple, les trois quarts des travailleurs permanents à temps plein 
reçoivent au moins un avantage, contre moins de la moitié des travailleurs 
qui appartiennent aux groupes atypiques. Ce modèle à deux niveaux 
est amplifié si l’on examine la présence ou non du groupe d’avantages 
sociaux. Alors qu’environ deux travailleurs permanents à temps plein sur 
cinq le reçoivent, on le retrouve chez seulement un sur dix permanents à 
temps partiel et temporaires à plein temps et chez moins de un sur vingt 
temporaires à temps partiel. Pour l’ensemble des avantages sociaux, nous 
avons observé que les permanents à plein temps se trouvent à un niveau 
significativement plus élevé. Dans cinq cas sur six, les temporaires à temps 
partiel bénéficient d’une couverture plus faible que les autres. Dans le cas 
unique restant, les temporaires à temps partiels se partagent le niveau le 
plus faible de couverture avec les autres travailleurs atypiques. Les per-
manents à temps partiel et les temporaires à temps plein se partagent un 
niveau mitoyen de couverture, supérieur à celui des temporaires à temps 
partiel mais plus faible que celui des permanents à plein temps. Cependant, 
dans quelque cas, les permanents à temps partiel semblent bénéficier d’une 
couverture plus élevée que les temporaires à temps plein et, dans d’autres 
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cas, le contraire se produit. En accord avec les conclusions antérieures 
qu’on trouve dans la documentation sur le sujet, nous avons observé que 
le champ d’application de la convention collective ou la grande taille d’un 
lieu de travail constituaient des variables de contrôle influentes augmentant 
la probabilité de toucher des avantages sociaux.
Nous concluons que les travailleurs assujettis à des contrats de travail 
à plein temps continuent à conserver le « noyau » quant à l’obtention 
d’avantages hors-salaire. Ils sont suivis par ceux qui travaillent à temps 
partiel sur une base permanente et par des occasionnels à plein temps, que 
nous considérons occuper la place près du « noyau ». Enfin, ceux qui sont 
liés par des contrats à temps partiel sur une base temporaire présentent une 
probabilité significativement moindre d’obtenir des avantages et, comme 
tel, nous les plaçons à la périphérie. Dans l’ensemble, les données montrent 
qu’il y a eu peu d’amélioration au regard des avantages sociaux chez les 
travailleurs et les travailleuses qui occupent des emplois atypiques depuis 
les conclusions du Rapport Wallace, il y a plus de vingt ans. La segmen-
tation du marché du travail « noyau-périphérie » continue d’exister, ainsi 
qu’une hiérarchisation additionnelle chez les travailleurs de la périphérie 
concernant les avantages sociaux.
